CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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2003

3 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Notes. Prepared by [redacted]

1. The Guardia Civil:

This police force is a sorry, one uniform organization. The Army can, and does, ignore them. The Chief has no prestige. The Secret Police used to be efficient, they had a crime laboratory, a finger print outfit and trained operators who turned up a lot of information but this has fallen apart. One should not make the error of considering the Guardia Civil as a body of troops. They are one grade above the zombies.

2. Rogelio CRUZ Wer, Director of the Guardia Civil:

CRUZ Wer is just another political appointee. The Army enjoys "Fuero de guerra" immunity from civil action. It can afford to snoot him and it does. The military men with whom I was associated on my recent trip treated CRUZ as a man of little consequence.

3. Personal Relations of High Ranking Army Officers:

The higher ranking officers do not, and never did, pal around, party, or frequent clubs or the Casino Militar. They are cooped up in their offices from 8 A.M. to 6 P.M. When they close the desk they hurry home to lock the door and get into shirt sleeves. They are unusually abstemious. No cliques exist because they are subject to suspicion. They have no close friends because one may get "in bad" and involve them by association. Below field grade the officers mix and keep the Casino Militar from being a morgue. Out of such elements came the boys who pulled the '44 revolution with amazing ease and success. This is why I deprecate too much study and card indexing of top level individuals. They won't stay indexed. They don't run according to form. Their loyalties, outside of patriotism, are things of the moment.

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4. 2 June Meeting With Col. Enrique PERALTA and Francisco OCANA:

[ ] and I entertained PERALTA and the Secretary of Embassy, Francisco OCANA, here in Washington on 2 June. PERALTA can't return home because of his stature nor can he resign because this would result in exile. This he cannot afford. He admits having been approached during his recent trip to Guatemala (May 13-31) to head a revolutionary movement. He predicts a race between the Commies and the Army to strike the first blow to determine which will run the country. He said that he had declined the offer made him because already his absence from Washington had made him an object of suspicion. While in Guatemala PERALTA was unable to see ARBENZ. He has been intentionally kept away from Guatemala by foreign assignment to Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and the United States for at least twelve years. He is too good to be allowed loose in Guatemala where he has a strong following. During the meeting OCANA was free spoken, anti-Commie and pro-U.S.. He is in bad at home and here in the Embassy because of his outspoken views. He confirmed the imminence of a "big change" and said, "When it comes, [ ], you'll be coming back to Guatemala with PERALTA."

5. Elfego MONZON, Minister Without Portfolio:

Since falling into disfavor, as result of Red insistance, Monzon has apparently lost influence. People avoid him for fear of guilt by association. Monzon helped organize the revolution of '44 and is very anti-Red. He is forceful, able, talks the Indian dialects, and can sway them. They love tough bosses. I would want him in any anti-government movement. He considers himself badly treated and a blow to a Guatemalan's pride is a grevious wound. He is vehement in his expressions - "This can't go on! It has gone too far already. Something must be done - but soon". He won t start anything but he will support it tooth and nail.

6. Luis GIRON, Chief of the Air Force:

Giron's outfit is not bothered by the Reds. He is pro-American as are his pilots. Practically all of them are U.S. trained. He is friendly and approachable but keeps out of politics. The Air Force would not be involved in a revolt and I doubt that they would support any home grown aggression.

7. Marroquin ROJAS:

Rojas is editor of "La Hora", the anti-Red newspaper, and has maintained admirable freedom of the press. He would be a good contact if discreetly approached.

8. Carlos Enrique DIAZ, Chief of the Armed Forces:

Ex-officio, Diaz, is a big factor. He is a presidential aspirant, anti-Red and a long wolf. He is hard to know, a toughie, and not afraid of Arbenz. Diaz has travelled in South and Central America and has learned a great deal regarding Guatemala's unpopularity and its cause.

9. Jose Leon PARINELLO, Chief of Staff:

Parinello is one of the few top notchers. He is a graduate of the Mexican Military Academy and has travelled extensively in the United States. He is bright, keen, a good organizer, and pro-U.S. He is also a patriot and enjoys Arbenz' favor.

10. Jose Angel SANCHEZ, Minister of Defense:

Sanchez is practically inert, congenitally a turncoat, and content to sit back and draw a nice salary. He commands the lip service of military men by the power of his position. He can discharge any officer or enlisted man by his verbal order. This man is tight lipped.

11. Marco Antonio FRANCO, President of the Chamber of Deputies:

Franco is a graduate of the Politecnica in the class of '43. He is cold blooded, foxy, and reputed to be strongly pro-Commie. He has, however, plebty of friends who fawn on him for his favor and for the business that he can throw their way.

12. Military Capabilities:

Although with a paper strength of approximately 6000, there would be great difficulty in fielding a task force of 1500. Taking the "flower of the army", such as it is, out of the capital would expose it to various kinds of disorders. Such a force would comprise the several "mobile units", at present existing only on paper, but ready to be organized per tables of organization already drawn up - Colonels, Lt. Colonels, Majors, Captains, Lieutenants, etc. - everything except soldiers.

Ready to go are the Guardia de Honor, the corps of Military Police, and several small garrisons in cities such as Solala, Huehuetenango, Lacapa and Quetzaltenango.

Outside of these, the army would consist of a mob; equipment one cartridge belt and a mauser of doubtful utility. They will have had no target practice. They will have had no: open order practice, first aid, field training of any kind - no medical service; little if any medicines, ambulances; communications nil; no officer will have commanded even a platoon in a field exercise. The NCO's 75% illiterate. They are dummies with chevrons.

Field messes would have to be improvised, likewise water supply in a country where rivers are scarce. No refrigeration. No inoculations.

Various calibers of arms present a problem. No maps except road maps.

The Guardia Civil (2000 cops) sound good, but they are mainly immature teenagers armed with a black-jack and a rusty revolver. Entirely unreliable. Sample - a lady complained to one of them about a man who had been following and annoying her - "What can I do? He's bigger than I am". As a reserve in the city, they would be pushovers. The civilians hate them for their arrogance.

Combined field exercises? Never heard of them. Air ground liaison? Ditto.